



THE POLISH QUARTERLY OF INTERNATIONAL **AFFAIRS**

volume 26

no. 1/2017

Islam in India

Piotr Kłodkowski

Double-Track Asymmetry: Poland's Alliances in the 21st Century

Andrzej Dybczyński

The Armed Forces of Belarus

Anna Maria Dyner

End of European Soft Power? Implications for EU Foreign Policy

Patryk Kugiel

Legal Protection of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Justyna Szałańska

The Prospects for U.S. Trade Policy under the Trump Administration

Beata Słomińska, Marek Wąsiński



PISM

POLSKI INSTYTUT SPRAW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



THE POLISH
QUARTERLY OF
INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS

volume 26

no. 1/2017



PISM

POLSKI INSTYTUT SPRAW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Copy editor: Brien Barnett

Proof-reading: Katarzyna Staniewska

Cover design: Malwina Kühn

Typeset: Dorota Dołęgowska

Contributors:

Piotr Kłodkowski—Ph.D., professor at the University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszów, Poland's former ambassador to India and Nepal

Andrzej Dybczyński—Ph.D., political scientist, researcher at the University of Wrocław

Anna Maria Dyner—analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs

Patryk Kugiel—analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs

Justyna Szałańska—Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Warsaw University

Beata Słomińska—senior expert at the Department of America, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland

Marek Wąsiński—analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs

David Cadier—Ph.D., associate at LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics

Agnieszka Szpak—Ph.D., assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

Publisher:

Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych (The Polish Institute of International Affairs)

ul. Warecka 1a, 00-950 Warszawa;

tel. +48 22 556 80 00; fax +48 22 556 80 99; e-mail: pqia@pism.pl

ISSN 1230-4999

The views expressed in *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* are solely those of the authors.

The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs is regularly presented in the catalogue of International Current Awareness Services, in Ulrich's International Periodical Directory, and in International Political Science Abstracts/Documentation Politique Internationale. Selected articles are included in the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences.

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Piotr Kłodkowski

Islam in India: Ideological Conflicts on the Subcontinent and
Their Political and Social Consequences in the Early 21st Century. 7

India's political coherence largely depends on New Delhi's ability to build a system of cross-cultural compromises among various communities. While the Muslim minority has lived and prospered in India for more than one thousand years, its relations with the Hindu majority have not always been harmonious. The partition of India in 1947 became a political reference point for many radical politicians interested in inciting communal conflicts that bring them political gains. Indian Muslims remain an ethnically and ideologically divided community and have not succeeded in setting up one political party in independent India. They are usually represented by regional parties in different states, but in all-India elections they frequently vote en bloc for the Indian National Congress, which is commonly perceived as a secular party opposed to extremist Hindu ideology. The author briefly analyses the history of Indian Muslims, presents the political consequences of the "Two Nations" theory and explains the reasons behind inter-religious clashes in contemporary India, predicting that the position of Indian Muslims will become a subject of fierce political debate in the years to come.

Andrzej Dybczyński

Double-Track Asymmetry: Alliances of the Republic of Poland
in the 21st Century 24

In the last quarter century, Poland has been one of the foremost beneficiaries of the post-Cold War international order; but its 30 years of uninterrupted development now seem to be drawing to an end. The disadvantageous and largely unpredictable changes in Poland's internal and external environment impart special relevance to the question about the methods and means to ensure the security of the state in the years to come—security which until now seemed guaranteed. One way to achieve this is to conduct an effective alliance policy, understood as selecting allies and building relations with them in such a way that will add to the security of the state and discourage an enemy from open aggression. Hence the urgent need for Poland to formulate a more sophisticated alliance policy than the existing one. This concerns not so much the choice of allies (in this respect, the room for manoeuvre is relatively limited and the choices fairly obvious) as, first and foremost, the

way it functions within existing alliances. The text outlines the determinants to which Poland's alliance policy will be subjected in years to come and suggests how this policy should be shaped based on the author's analysis of Poland's security environment and its foreign policy as well as on his research into the phenomenon of alliances as such.

Anna Maria Dyner

The Armed Forces of Belarus 38

The annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine have significantly altered the security infrastructure in Eastern Europe and impacted the Belarusian authorities, who have begun to pay more attention to the condition of their country's military. The text examines the structure of Belarusian armed forces and their military relations with Russia. Regional defence alliances, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) or military cooperation (joint exercises and industrial cooperation) between Belarus and its allies are also reviewed, along with the condition of the Belarusian armed forces and their ability to defend the country's territory.

Patryk Kugiel

End of European Soft Power? Implications for EU Foreign Policy . . . 59

Three developments in 2016 led to the EU losing a lot of its soft power, constraining its ability to exert influence on third countries. An evolution in its response to the refugee crisis, rising Euroscepticism and populism in Europe, and the Brexit referendum have all undermined the European project and image of the EU as a political model and global norm-setter. Though the EU still retains much strength, it must rethink how it uses its power, acknowledge the limitations, focus on rebuilding its credibility, and pursue more a pragmatic and modest foreign policy.

Justyna Szalańska

Legal Protection of Syrian Refugees in Turkey against the Background of International Legal Determinants 73

Recent UNHCR data show that nearly 3 million Syrian refugees have fled to Turkey, where they are not recognised as refugees. Turkey has, however, adopted a new law to offer Syrians temporary protection, which means a residence permit, access to education, health care and employment, but also an opportunity to acquire Turkish citizenship on certain conditions. This text focuses on the current regulations for the protection of Syrian refugees in Turkey, outlining the legal status of refugees and examining the impact of their influx on the Turkish policy towards asylum-seekers from non-European countries.

Beata Słomińska, Marek Wąsiński

The Prospects for U.S. Trade Policy under the Trump Administration 85

A reform of U.S. trade policy was among the priorities of Donald Trump's campaign. Guidelines of the new policy developed by Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro, head of the National Trade Council, were then included in the Presidential Trade Agenda for 2017. A lower trade deficit

is a key target seen by the new administration as a prerequisite for boosting economic growth. Duties and taxes are to be introduced to countervail unfair practices, which are among the sources of the deficit. The new administration's preference for bilateral rather than multilateral agreements is reiterated. Keeping with his campaign promises, Trump has signed executive orders to withdraw the U.S. from Trans-Pacific Partnership and to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement.

David Cadier

Why France and Poland (Should) Need Each Other 101

If European politics is seen as an amusement park, Franco-Polish relations would be a roller coaster and a house of mirrors. Over the last three years, bilateral relations between Warsaw and Paris went from one of its highest to one of its lowest points in recent history. The causes and manifestations of the current tensions in diplomatic and political relations are well known. They should not, however, overshadow the substantive economic links and vibrant cultural ties between the two countries. Nor should they lead to discarding or underestimation of the potential that closer strategic and political relations could bear.

Agnieszka Szpak

International Solidarity as the Basis for Millennium/Sustainable Development Goals 108

The paper depicts international solidarity as the pillar on which the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) should be based, along with international cooperation and humanitarian and development aid undertaken within the process, thus contributing to human security and global peace. The implementation of the MDGs and SDGs will help close the gap between economically developed countries and developing ones. Humanitarian and developmental aid as specific forms of international cooperation based on international solidarity and rendered in accordance with the UN Charter are necessary tools to build peace and development, and, as a result, to solve many crises, such as mass migration.

Islam in India: Ideological Conflicts on the Subcontinent and Their Political and Social Consequences in the Early 21st Century

The Indian subcontinent is home to nearly half a billion Muslims, or around a third of all followers of Islam globally. In India, their number is estimated at 180 million, or just above 14% of the country's total population,¹ which makes them the world's largest religious minority. Their relations with India's Hindu majority largely determine social stability and cultural coherence (or lack of it) in the country, and is greatly influenced by the shared history of both communities. This history, with its symbolic elements, has been and continues to be used to devise more or less radical ideologies and push specific agendas in central and regional politics. Periods of relatively peaceful coexistence were interrupted by bloody conflicts, and memories of them affect the political identity of both Hindus and Muslims—if not the whole respective communities, then at least their most politically active representatives. The two-way tensions, while tending to be eased by the secular structures of the Republic of India, its economic success and the gradual rise of civic society, have by no means been removed. Indian Muslims, highly diversified culturally, ethnically, and linguistically as they are, build their political position in the state either in harmony with the majority of Indian society or, increasingly, in often radical opposition to the ideology of Hindu fundamentalism, which of late has been considerably gaining importance. Developments in India, and especially its communal relations, also exert an impact on New Delhi's relations with Muslim nations seen by the Indian government as key partners, especially in its energy policy.

¹ 2011 census data, www.censusindia.gov.in.

A Symbolic Gesture by the Prime Minister

On 17 September 2011, the then-chief minister of Gujarat and present Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi organised a Sadbhavna (“Peace and Tolerance”) Mission with the goal of promoting communal harmony in that part of the country. The event was held in Ahmedabad, in Gujarat University’s Convention Hall.

There, he was approached by Imam Shahi Saiyed, representing the Muslim community in the small village of Pirane, who, just as other religious representatives before him, wanted to pay homage and presented Modi with a symbolic gift, a decorated skull cap worn by local Muslims. Obviously the cap had its meaning, just as other headgear worn by members of various religious or ethnic groups. And previously, Modi had been seen at public events—and had been photographed—wearing various caps, hats, and turbans. This time, though, he refused, unwilling to accept the skull cap from the imam which he would be expected to put on for a short time, per custom. He said he would accept a shawl, but not the skull cap. The surprised imam, as registered by cameras, spoke emotionally to a group of journalists present at the event, arguing that the refusal was “not an insult of me but an insult of Islam.”²

The apparently minor incident was publicised nationally on dozens of TV channels and in numerous press commentaries. Accusations of intolerance towards Muslims were hurled and needlessly stirred a smouldering communal conflict. The strongest criticism came from the Indian National Congress, the oldest and nominally secular party (established in 1885) which ruled the country for several decades. Modi was defended by adherents of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which three years later, in 2014, decisively won the national parliamentary elections. The context of what happened was not lost on both the watchers of the Indian political scene and its participants. Sadbhavna Mission was to serve as a form of public atonement for Gujarat’s bloody riots of 10 years prior, which some described as an “anti-Muslim pogrom” and others, using conciliatory if not quite accurate language, as the most dramatic event for the followers of Hinduism and Islam,

² See: “Refusing to Wear Skull Cap Insult to Islam: Imam,” *The Economic Times* (Mumbai Edition), 20 September 2011, p. 2.

casting a shadow on the relatively good communal relations in contemporary India. Modi's public gesture put in question his actual intentions.

Gujarat Pogrom, Its Origins, and Consequences

The main facts about the Gujarat pogrom are widely known throughout India, even if its scale has been frequently disputed.

The chain of events was triggered by an attack on pilgrims on their way back from Ayodhya, a city in the north of the country revered by Hindus and believed to be the birth place of Lord Rama. Several centuries ago, the Mughal Emperor Babur ordered a mosque to be built exactly on the sacred spot, sparking a longstanding communal dispute that defied reconciliation efforts. Finally, in 1992, a Hindu crowd demolished the mosque and an announcement was made that a Lord Rama temple would be erected there in the future. Thus, pilgrimages to Ayodhya can be seen by radical Muslims as a provocation, especially when they are attended by activists from extreme Hindu organisations.

In February 2002, a train with Ayodhya pilgrims stopping in the Godhra railway station caught fire, possibly a result of arson. Fifty-nine people died in the fire, all of them Hindus. Charges of arson and murder were hurled at Muslims, with only a few people believing the cause of the ignition was a result of a breakdown. Some media claimed Pakistan's intelligence service was involved. A wave of violent assaults against Muslim homes, shops, mosques, and other places of worship followed and spread into all major cities in Gujarat, including Ahmedabad, Gandhinagar, Vadodar, Surat and Mehsana. The carnage did not quite look like a spontaneous outbreak of anger in response to the Godhra bloodshed, but more like a well-prepared, logistically coordinated project. The Muslim community, for its part, responded to the violence with violence: in a string of cities, Hindus were attacked with equal cruelty. The police and security services proved ineffective and were actually accused of connivance, if not participation, in the riots. It took fairly long for local authorities to regain control and for the emotions to subside. Only several years after the pogrom did the New Delhi government reveal the death toll to parliament. A total of 790 Muslims and

234 Hindus were said to have been murdered, with 2,500 wounded and 223 missing, but many researchers, politicians and NGO activists argued that the actual number of victims was at least twice as high.³

Independent India had witnessed sporadic outbreaks of bloody communal violence, but with much lower frequency than the country's population density and ethnic and religious diversity might suggest. The Gujarat massacre thus came as a double shock, given that the Indian middle class widely saw that state as a symbol of 21st century India, a place where economic growth and technological change went hand in hand with multicultural harmony and social peace. The attacks were believed to be inspired, or at least condoned, by Modi, who had led the state cabinet for several months, although no hard evidence to that effect was provided. Responding to the political storm raging throughout India, Modi tendered his resignation and dismissed the whole cabinet, but in the same year he regained the office—with a stronger mandate—following a snap election in which his party, BJP, won an absolute majority.⁴

An official investigation into the Gujarat riots conducted at the central level (or rather a series of diverse probes) took a long time to complete. In 2008, the Supreme Court appointed a special investigation team, which after five years of arduous examination and analysis indicted 249 people, most of them followers of Hinduism. On the other hand, reports from independent bodies pointed to the heroism of many Hindus, including police officers, who risked their lives to save Muslim fellow citizens. The overall picture did not fit into black and white classifications.⁵

Modi could be seen as morally culpable, but that did not necessarily translate into court-established guilt. In 2012, he was finally cleared by the investigation team of charges of complicity in the pogroms. A similar verdict was passed by the Gujarat cabinet as a whole (excluding some of its members). That provoked another heated discussion at home and abroad, sparking many protests from numerous leaders of the Muslim community. But there was

³ See: Ch. Jaffrelot, *Communal Riots in Gujarat, The State at Risk?*, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, Working Paper No. 17, 2003.

⁴ For more about the present prime minister, see: M. Desai *et al.*, *Making Sense of Modi's India*, HarperCollins Publisher, 2016.

⁵ See: "Narendra Modi gets clean chit in SIT report on Gujarat riots," *The Times of India*, 10 April 2012, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

little ground to suspect any manipulation, given that the undivided power in New Delhi was then wielded by the Indian National Congress, which would gladly see Modi in prison. The official clean bill of health was tantamount to a pass to the prime ministerial position, which Modi assumed in May 2014. That opened a new chapter in the modern history of relations between the Hindu majority and the large Muslim minority.

Islam's Thousand-Year Presence on the Subcontinent

It would be hard to imagine Indian culture today without a strong Muslim component, which for centuries has impacted the subcontinent's multi-confessional civilisation. Beginning from the 8th century, Muslims were colonising ever-larger areas, and in the 13th century established the Delhi Sultanate, soon to become a major political player in the north of India. According to Jan Kieniewicz, the turning point came in 1206, "when a full-fledged Indian state of followers of Islam took shape."⁶ Hinduism held out, for some time, only in the south, one example being the Vijayanagara Empire, which in the 14th century effectively blocked the advances of Muslim troops and whose king was viewed as an ideal defender of *dharma*.⁷ The 16th century saw the ascendancy of the Mughal dynasty, which gradually built one of the world's most powerful multicultural empires, with Islam the official religion and Persian the language of the court. Masterpieces of the Mughal heritage, such as the marble mausoleum Taj Mahal, an all-time tourist attraction, recognised as an architectural wonder of the world, and the imperial residences of Red Fort in Delhi and Agra Fort, are part of the identity of Indian Muslims and, to the same degree, of the all-India identity. How successive Mughal emperors are judged in India depends more on the religion of the person judging than their political views. And so, the Emperor Akbar the Great (d. 1605) is described in official textbooks as full of tolerance and understanding for non-Muslims. And indeed, his philosophical debates, to which he also invited Hindus and Christians, did fit in with the Indian

⁶ J. Kieniewicz, *Historia Indii*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1980, p. 228.

⁷ *Dharma*, a key concept in Indian philosophy, is translated differently, in accordance with the context. Here it means "the right way of living" and "justice"—obviously, as exhibited by the ruler of a Hindu state.